Brown & Brown reported second-quarter results after Monday’s close: total revenues of $1.68 billion, up 30.4% from a year earlier. Net income attributable to the company was $288 million, up 24.7%. Diluted earnings per share landed at $0.84, up 7.7%. On an adjusted basis, $1.07, up 3.9%.
Then there is the number the company puts in its own headline. Organic Revenue — the revenue produced by operations it owned in both periods — declined 0.7%. Add profit-sharing contingent commissions back in and it grew 0.7%.
Thirty percent revenue growth. Roughly zero underlying growth. The gap between those two numbers has a price tag.
What $9.8 billion buys
On August 1, 2025, Brown & Brown closed its acquisition of RSC Topco — the holding company behind Accession Risk Management Group, parent of Risk Strategies and One80 — for a gross purchase price of $9.825 billion on a cash- and debt-free basis. It was by far the largest deal in the broker’s history, and it is the reason the top line moved.
The first quarter said the same thing, more starkly. Revenue rose 35.4% to $1.9 billion. Acquisitions contributed $435 million of core commissions and fees. Organic Revenue was flat — not approximately flat, exactly 0.0%. Diluted EPS fell 7.8%. CEO J. Powell Brown called it “a challenging growth environment.” Two quarters into 2026, the book of business Brown & Brown owned before the deal has produced nothing.
Our take: Roll-ups are a legitimate strategy — insurance brokerage has consolidated this way for forty years, and Brown & Brown is very good at it. The problem is that acquisitions are a one-time trick per target and organic growth is the thing that repeats. Right now the acquired revenue is masking a core that is going sideways at best. When the Accession contribution laps in August, the mask comes off and the reported growth rate converges on the organic one. That is roughly six weeks away.
The bill arrives in the middle of the income statement
Bought growth is not free growth, and the March-quarter filing shows where it costs. Interest expense ran $99 million in Q1 2026 against $46 million a year earlier. Amortization more than doubled, to $116 million from $53 million. Goodwill sat at $15.1 billion on March 31 — against total equity of $12.6 billion — alongside $6.6 billion of long-term debt and another $1.2 billion due within the year.
That is why the second quarter’s profit grew slower than its revenue: income before income taxes rose 23.2% to $383 million, but margin fell to 22.9% from 24.2%. Revenue up 30.4%, adjusted EPS up 3.9%. Almost none of the top-line growth reached the shareholder.
Wall Street wasn’t thrilled either. Consensus had revenue near $1.72 billion; $1.68 billion missed it by about 2.5%. Adjusted EPS came in line.
What to watch
- The August lap. Accession closed August 1, 2025. From the third quarter, its revenue starts counting as organic. Reported growth and organic growth converge fast.
- Whether organic turns positive. Two consecutive quarters at zero or below is a trend, not noise. Management has blamed the pricing environment; the third quarter is where that claim gets tested.
- Deleveraging pace. A $9.8 billion deal financed partly with debt in a higher-rate world means interest expense is now a permanent line item, not a transition cost.
- Goodwill. $15.1 billion of it against $12.6 billion of equity. If the acquired business underperforms, the write-down math is unforgiving.
The broader lesson generalizes well past insurance: when a company’s revenue growth and its earnings growth diverge by 26 percentage points, the growth is being rented, not owned. Read the organic line first. It is usually the smallest number on the page and always the most honest one.